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ABSTRACT
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING: PARTISANSHIP
AND SENTENCING SEVERITY BY STATE TRIAL JUDGES

Sean Daly, MA
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2015
Artemus Ward, Director

American trial judges exercise an enormous power when they sentence criminal
offenders to a specific length of incarceration. Does the partisan affiliation of the trial judge
affect the final determination in an offender’s length of incarceration? Using a
psychological framework, I examine the effects that partisanship, and ideology have on a
judge’s perception of the root causes of crime and the primary purpose that sentencing
should serve in our criminal justice system. Using a unique proxy measure for judicial
partisanship I analyze violent felony cases in Washington State from 2000 to 2006. I find
that a Republican judge hands down a sentence 4.4% longer than a Democratic judge,
controlling for other case factors. Additional analysis shows that this finding is most
prominent in rape cases, in which a Republican judge can be expected to hand down a
sentence 34% longer than his Democratic counterpart. I conclude with several possible
explanations on why rape cases would trigger an exceptionally longer sentence from a
Republican judge.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In 2013 over six million individuals were subject to the supervision of a state
correctional system, with two million serving time in either prison or local jails and the
remainder on probation or parole (Glaze and Kaeble 2014). While prosecutors initiate and
file formal criminal charges against individuals, trial judges are the political actors with the
ultimate authority to exercise the state’s power to deprive a person of their liberty. State and
federal legislatures, both experiencing financial budgetary constraints, continue to debate
the issue of sentencing reform for the purpose of alleviating costs, the discussion being
primarily concerned with statutory changes and modification of sentencing guidelines.
Researchers in the fields of political science and criminology have contributed to these
policy debates with empirical analyses of factors that influence sentencing outcomes. While
political scientists have focused on the effects of judicial selection method and public
opinion on sentencing behavior (Berdejo and Yuchtman 2013; Gordon and Huber 2004,
2007; Kuklinski and Stanga 1979; Nelson 2014), criminologists have concentrated on,
among other things, characteristics of the judge, case, and defendant (Kulik, Perry, and
Pepper 2003; Steffensmeir and Britt 2001; Steffensmeier and Hebert 1999; Tiede, Carp, and
Manning 2010).
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These two fields have not been mutually exclusive, rather the political science
literature on state judicial behavior can be seen as acknowledging the importance of judge
and defendant characteristics and incorporating them into broader theoretical models. The
dominant approach to examining judicial decision-making among elected state judges is
that, similar to members of Congress (Arnold 1990; Downs 1957; Kingdon 1977; Mayhew
1974), they are rational actors that seek reelection to the bench as their primary goal and
therefore make decisions in accordance with that goal (Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1995;
Brooks and Raphael 2002; McGuire 2012; Savchak and Barghothi 2007; Traut and Emmert
1998). While this body of literature has increased our understanding of how trial judges
reach decisions when sentencing, it has largely sidestepped the question of whether a
judge’s individual penal philosophy influences sentencing behavior. Those who have
attempted to account for judicial partisanship in their research have focused primarily on
the state of Kansas (Gordon and Huber 2007; Lim 2013), finding little evidence that party
affiliation influences sentencing outcomes. These studies have echoed the previous
literature and attributed sentencing variations to selection method and electoral incentives.
The primary question of interest in this paper is whether the partisanship of state
trial judges affects their sentencing behavior. In other words, do Democratic and
Republican judges differ in their sentencing decisions in cases where they are able to
exercise discretion? I hypothesize that Republican judges will sentence offenders more
punitively than their Democratic counterparts. While this hypothesis may appear intuitively
simple given that the Republican Party has largely taken ownership on the issue of crime
(Egan 2013; Petrocik 1996) and Republican voters are more favorable towards the death
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penalty1 and longer criminal sentences2, surprisingly little research has been done
attempting to empirically measure the influence that partisanship has on criminal
sentencing. The major contribution of this research is a renewed theoretical approach to
judicial decision-making that focuses first and foremost on the sentencing philosophy of the
individual judge.
Studying trial court judges and their sentencing decisions is important for a number
of reasons. First, criminal sentencing is a forum where the fundamental concept of equality
under the law interacts with individualized decision-making. The stakes are especially high
in criminal cases as the outcome can be the deprivation of a citizen’s liberty, property, and
potentially his life. Additionally, 48 states and the District of Columbia deny the right to
vote to those who are incarcerated for a felony and 12 states permanently disenfranchise
certain classes of felons based on the crime and time period it was committed,3 again
showing the high stakes of case outcomes. Lastly, appellate courts are highly deferential to
the decisions of lower courts in sentencing appeals (O’Hear 2010), meaning the trial
judge’s sentence is likely to be the one that the offender will serve. In states that use a
determinate sentencing scheme offenders are not eligible for parole, making the trial
judge’s decision all but final and determinative. Given the significance of the sentencing

Pew Research Center. 2015. “Less Support for Death Penalty, Especially Among Democrats.” April 16.
(available at http://www.people-press.org/files/2015/04/04-16-15-Death-penalty-release.pdf).
1

Public Opinion Strategies. 2012. “Public Opinion on Sentencing and Corrections in America.” March.
(available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/PEW_NationalSurveyResearchPaper_FINAL.pdf).
2

The Sentencing Project. 2014. “Statement of the Sentencing Project: To the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on The Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights.” December 9. (available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Statement_for_SJC_Hearing_on_Civil_and_Human_Rights_
in_the_U.S._Dec_2014.pdf).
3

4
outcome in criminal trials it is important that researchers and policy makers have a better
understanding of the factors that can influence the length of incarceration that is imposed by
the judge.
This is a first step in attempting to better understand the effect of the human element
in trial judge sentencing behavior. The human element refers to the individual view that
each judge has on the causes of crime and the purposes of criminal sentencing. I
operationalize this by using a proxy measure for the partisanship of the trial judge, which
provides an indication of the judge’s ideological views and sentencing philosophy (Carroll
et al. 1987; Schanzenbach and Tiller 2008). Empirical examinations of how partisan
identification affects a judge’s decision-making dates back to the seminal work of Schubert
(1959) and Nagel (1961). While partisanship is not perfectly correlated with ideology,
research on judicial decision-making has confirmed conventional wisdom and found that
“party is a dependable measure of ideology in modern American courts” (Pinello 1999,
243). Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000, 391) further state that “[w]ithin courts, partisan
affiliation taps ideological differences among judges.”
In the following I first develop my theoretical model that examines judicial penal
philosophy and how that philosophy is connected to partisanship. This initial section will
demonstrate how the partisan identification of a judge is connected to his views on criminal
sentencing, and how these views affect sentencing outcomes. Second, I discuss the existing
literature on sentencing behavior of federal and state judges. Third, I discuss judicial
elections and criminal sentencing in Washington State. Washington provides an ideal – and
conservative – case study as trial judges are chosen through nonpartisan elections, and they
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have been operating under a sentencing guideline regime for over thirty years.4 Fourth, I
detail the data and statistical methodology that will be used to test my hypothesis. Next, I
present the findings from my analysis. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of the
implications of my findings as well as further research that can be conducted to better
understand the complex process of judicial decision-making in the area of criminal
sentencing. I examine criminal sentence outcomes within Washington State, where trial
judges are chosen through nonpartisan elections, and find Republican and Democratic
judges differ in their sentencing of rape offenders. On average, a Republican judge can be
expected to hand down a sentence approximately 35% longer than a Democratic judge for a
person convicted of the felony offense of rape.

4

Felony sentencing in Washington is governed by the 1981 Washington Sentencing Reform Act (RCW
9.94A.310)

CHAPTER 2
TRIAL JUDGES AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING

In Sentencing as a Human Process, Hogarth (1971) describes a magistrate’s
sentencing decision as one that is in all respects linked to the subjective perception of the
sentencing judge. The author utilizes survey data collected from individual magistrates in
Ontario, Canada and combines this with sentencing data to understand the role that the
judge’s personality plays in the decision-making process. After extensive data collection
and rigorous empirical testing, he concludes that case facts, legal factors, and other
“features of the external world are interpreted, assimilated, and made sense of in ways
compatible with the attitudes of the magistrate” (382). Each judge possesses a unique set of
beliefs regarding the root causes of crime and the purpose of sentencing, and these beliefs
create a lens through which everything else is viewed. The facts of the case, governing law,
social context, and characteristics of the defendant are all viewed from the lens of the judge
as an individual human actor. In this respect, criminal sentencing is a complex process that
originates with the judge as an individual and is therefore dependent upon the judge’s
beliefs and attitudes, which are themselves influenced by personal experience (Johnson
2006; Myers and Talarico 1987). Beliefs regarding the root causes of crime can be
generally divided into two broader psychological views, the first being that individual
behavior is best explained as the product of the person’s circumstances, and the second
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stating that each person is responsible for their own behavior, and their actions are rooted in
their dispositions (Lane 2011, 764-65). In the case of criminal sentencing, liberal judges
will subscribe to the circumstantial perspective, believing external factors are a significant
cause for an offender’s criminal conduct, and they will view rehabilitation as the primary
goal of sentencing (Hofer, Blackwell, and Ruback 1999). Conversely, conservative judges
will view the offender’s disposition and personal decisions as a significant cause of the
criminal act and will therefore view retribution as the goal of sentencing (Hofer, Blackwell,
and Ruback 1999). Since conservative judges will be more focused on punishment of the
offender it follows that the sentence they hand down will be more punitive than their liberal
colleagues.
This argument served as the theoretical explanation for experimental research
conducted by Partridge and Eldridge (1974), and Forst and Wellford (1981). Both of these
studies consisted of providing federal judges with hypothetical cases on identical offenders
and asking them to identify the sentence they would hand down. In the hypothetical case
involving a person convicted of heroin possession, judges differed in their sentencing
depending on whether the offender was presented as being addicted to heroin. Of those
judges presented with an offender suffering from a heroin addiction, a small but significant
portion gave a reduced prison sentence or suspended the sentence in favor of probation and
commitment to a rehabilitation program (Partridge and Eldridge 1974, 47). These judges’
decisions were altered upon the knowledge of the offender’s circumstances, and sentences
were reduced given the context of the offender’s condition. In accord with the theory I have
presented, the judges who lowered their sentences and focused instead on rehabilitation
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would possess a liberal sentencing philosophy in which context matters. The judges whose
sentencing did not change even in light of the offender’s addiction would have a
conservative leaning and would assign blame equally to the offender regardless of his
situation.
In addition to the offender’s contextual environment, judges also disagree on the
seriousness of a particular case. The level of seriousness that is assigned by the judge based
on the nature of the offense strongly influences the sentencing outcome, even controlling
for the judge’s tendency to be more lenient or tough in their sentencing (Clancy et al. 1981;
Forst and Wellford 1981). Different judges will look at the same offense scenario and reach
different opinions on how severe they consider the offense to be. In other words, a judge’s
sentencing proclivities may be best understood by interacting sentencing tendencies with
the offenses being examined. The possibility of an interaction between a judge’s
partisanship and the offense committed is examined in a separate statistical model below.
A shortfall of this previous research is that it has been primarily devoted to judges
who serve on federal courts. Since these Article III judges are appointed for life, they are
largely immune from the external pressures of the electorate, factors that must be taken into
consideration by state judges in election and retention systems. An elected judge may prefer
to hand down a more lenient sentence based on the context of the offender and the offense,
but this preference must be further weighed against potential backlash from constituents.
This added interaction of electoral pressures and constituent preferences is what
distinguishes this research from the previous scholarship on partisanship and sentencing.
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Partisanship, Ideology, and Federal Sentencing

One of the prevailing theories among federal court scholars studying judicial
decision-making is the attitudinal model, which states that the attitudes and values with
which a judge associates should cause them to support certain legal claims while opposing
others (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 69). Since federal judges do not typically state their
ideological preferences, their liberal/conservative predispositions are determined by
examining the partisan affiliation of the appointing president, which serves as a reliable
proxy measure of ideology (George and Epstein 1992; Nagel 1961; Tate 1981). Research
among federal judges has repeatedly shown that Democratic presidents appoint more liberal
judges than their Republican counterparts (Brudney, Schiavoni, and Merrit 1999; Stidham,
Carp, and Songer 1996), with the former deciding cases in accord with their liberal
ideology and the latter with their conservative ideology (Nagel 1961; Segal and Spaeth
1993). Likewise, in federal criminal cases in which judicial discretion exists at the
sentencing stage, it would be expected that Democratic judges would exercise their
discretion in accord with their liberal ideology and hand down a less severe sentence than
Republican Judges. Tiede, Carp, and Manning (2010) control for judge, defendant, and case
characteristics and find evidence supporting this claim. The reason provided for this
connection is that Democratic judges, reflecting a liberal ideology, will be more
sympathetic to criminal defendants whereas Republican judges, exercising a conservative
ideology, will favor prosecution and law enforcement (Tiede, Carp, and Manning 2010,
255; George 2001, 34; Schanzenbach and Tiller 2008, 720-21).
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Examining the composition of federal district courts, Schanzenbach and Tiller
(2007) found that even under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines significant disparity in
sentencing existed, and that this disparity was associated with the partisan affiliation of the
sentencing judge. Using the proxy measure of the appointing president’s party, the findings
indicated that judges appointed by Democratic presidents gave less severe sentences than
their Republican colleagues for drug, theft, and violent crimes. Later research built on this
study and added individual judge identifying information by creating a unique database
using cases from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system, which is
a centralized database that houses federal court records. In an examination of 2,000 federal
drug cases the results echoed earlier research; federal judges appointed by Democratic
presidents handed down less severe sentences than judges appointed by Republican
presidents (Schanzenbach and Tiller 2008).
More recently the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC)1, an
organization based out of Syracuse University has, through extensive Freedom of
Information Act requests, collected over 20 years of federal sentencing data which includes
judge identifying information. The most recent report published by TRAC (2012) and
reported on by The New York Times found varying degrees of sentencing disparity among
judges within the same federal courthouse.2 Controlling only for the randomness in which
cases are assigned to judges, the report found that of the eight judges in the Baltimore,

1

While TRAC releases reports to the general public on sentencing variations among federal judges, access to
the database which houses case and judge identifying information requires a paid subscription.
Secret, Mosi. 2012. “Wide Sentencing Disparity Found Among U.S. Judges.” New York Times, March 5
2012.
2
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Maryland federal courthouse the median sentence was 57 months, with one judge handing
down an average of 17 months incarceration and another judge handing down an average of
78 months. While political affiliation of the judges is not indicated in the report, it provides
further empirical evidence that judges differ in their attitudes toward sentencing even in the
presence of a sentencing guideline regime.
The previously discussed work has been focused on sentencing outcomes at the
level of the federal judiciary. The primary reason for this has been limitations on data
available at the state level. Every year the U.S. Sentencing Commission collects and
publishes case-level sentencing data for all persons convicted of a federal offense. Prior to
2009, this sentencing data could not be cross referenced with the sentencing judge due to
USSC policy. Since the release of judge level identifying information by TRAC,
researchers have been able to connect sentencing outcomes with the sentencing judge.
While this research provides strong evidence supporting the claim that judges’ partisanship
affects sentencing outcome, the findings are not necessarily generalizable to state trial
judges. Unlike federal judges, trial judges in all but a handful of states serve for a fixed
term, after which they are generally required to face the electorate in a competitive or
retention election. Given the premise that a judge is primarily interested in retaining his seat
on the bench, he must factor into his decision-making the preferences of the electorate the
and possibility that he will be challenged in an upcoming election. While studying the
effects of partisanship on the sentencing behavior of federal judges can provide a better
understanding of the interaction between the two, the electoral constraints faced by state
judges presents a fundamentally different environment that requires its own research focus.
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On a more practical level, of the 1.1 million felony offenders that were sentenced in 2006,
only 73,000 individuals were sentenced in federal courts (Durose et al. 2009). With 94% of
sentences occurring in state trial courts, and trial judges in 39 states having to stand for
some form of reelection, the focus on life tenured federal judges has overlooked the elected
political actors that hand down the vast majority of criminal sentences. While case-level
sentencing data has in the past been notoriously difficult to obtain, state sentencing
commissions, which are employed by twenty-one states, have recently begun aggregating
this data to monitor the effects of sentencing guidelines. The availability of this data has led
to a new focus on state trial judge behavior.
The relationship between partisanship and attitudes toward crime runs deeper than
the judicial system, and can be found in all aspects of politics. Republican presidential
candidates and congressional candidates have long held a “tough on crime” stance that was
synonymous with punishing offenders and increasing mandatory sentences (Holian 2004).
In the 1980s President Reagan and the Republican Party came to own the issue of crime
with this approach (Petrocik 1996). Focusing on media accounts of rising crime rates, the
party labeled Democrats as coddlers of criminals and placed themselves as the defender of
crime victims. Holian (2004) finds that beginning with Clinton, Democrats were able to
shake the soft on crime label and rebrand themselves as the party of crime prevention. The
partisan divide over how to prevent future crime and manage criminals is prevalent among
the electorate and those who serve in office, making it seem almost inevitable that these
differences would eventually arise within an elected judiciary.
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State Trial Judges and Sentencing Behavior

Analysis of sentencing behavior at the state level has the benefit of introducing an
additional layer of constraints on the sentencing judge in the form of political factors such
as judicial selection method and constituent ideology. In other words, focusing on a state
level analysis allows the researcher to view the judge’s decision as a function of “what they
prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but constrained by what they
perceive is feasible to do” (Gibson 1983, 9). While a judge may prefer to sentence an
offender according to his or her personal attitudes, state selection method, constituent
opinion, and sentencing guidelines established by the legislature all serve as constraints on
these attitudes. Recent studies on sentencing behavior at the state level have examined the
interaction between judicial selection method and sentencing outcomes, with results
indicating that a judge’s decision-making is influenced by his proximity to an upcoming
election (Berdejo and Yuchtman 2013; Gordon and Huber 2004, 2007). In Pennsylvania,
where trial judges stand for retention election, judges measured as liberal are found to
sentence more punitively as they approach reelection (Gordon and Huber 2004).3 The
reason given for this is that liberal judges fear being labeled as soft on crime by political
opponents, and will therefore increase their sentencing behavior as they approach reelection
to be more in accord with their conservative colleagues. In examining the variation in
sentencing behavior between appointed and elected judges in Kansas, Gordon and Huber
3

To measure judicial ideology the authors utilize a formula based on judge attributes, including age, gender,
and prosecutorial experience. Measuring judge ideology using such attributes has generally been regarded as
controversial in the literature (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000).
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(2007) find that elected judges sentence more punitively than their appointed colleagues.
They attribute this finding to the electoral constraints faced by elected judges and their
proximity to the next election. While not conclusive, the limited research in the field has
shown that judges may feel constrained by constituent preferences when sentencing
offenders close to an election.
Sentencing decisions by state trial judges are inherently public acts, especially in
higher profile cases likely to receive media attention. Additionally, voters prefer more
punitive sentences than judges hand down. When asked whether “the courts in [the
respondent’s] area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals,” 82.8% of
respondents answered that courts are “not harsh enough,” while only 12.2% and 5.2%
answered that courts were “about right” or “too harsh,” respectively.4 Voters may prefer
harsher sentences, however their preferences often lay dormant until after a perceived
lenient sentence is handed down and made public through media reporting. Roberts and
Edwards (1989) find that voters’ punitive tendencies are largely a product of their
informational environment. When shown a newspaper account of a criminal trial and the
resulting sentence, respondents almost always preferred a more punitive sentence than that
handed down by the judge. In contrast, respondents that were shown more detailed court
transcripts and case facts were much less likely to believe the sentence was too lenient.
Through agenda setting and priming, the news media’s constant focus on crime related
stories leads voters to believe crime rates are rising when in reality they have dropped

General Social Surveys, 1972-2006 [cumulative File]: Courts Dealing with Criminals – (available at
http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Data+Analysis). While the GSS is a national survey the responses from
respondents in the Pacific region are almost identical to those for the nation as a whole.
4
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(Beale 2006). In covering a story, media outlets can employ an episodic frame in which an
issue is conveyed through a specific instance, or a thematic frame in which an issue is
presented within a broader historical and geographic context (Iyengar 1996). Beale (2006,
448) posits that in the context of crime, market-driven media outlets are more likely to
employ an episodic framing of a crime related story, which may result in viewers
supporting more punitive punishments as they attribute the criminal conduct to the
individuals personal attributes. Furthermore, relentless coverage of crime in the media can
produce feelings of fear and anxiety in viewers, which leads to a preference for immediate
solutions in the form of more punitive punishments (Sotirovic 2001).
The research on trial judge decision-making has so far focused primarily on the
effects that elections have on a judge’s sentencing behavior. There has been little focus on
whether the judge’s sentencing behavior is influenced by his partisan identification and
ideology. One reason for this is that party identification is inherently difficult to determine
at the trial level unless the state employs partisan elections. But is it reasonable to conclude
that judges chosen through nonpartisan elections are themselves void of any partisan
leanings? On the contrary, research has indicated that party organizations remain active in
judicial elections even in states with nonpartisan selection methods (Hall 2009; Streb 2007).
Additionally, candidates running for office in a nonpartisan election may have held a
previously partisan position or may be actively involved with – yet not endorsed by - a
party organization (Taylor and Schreckhise 2003). In the case of nonpartisan judicial
elections, candidates may try to signal their party affiliation through their campaign
slogans. While judges, in general, adopt a slogan that is some variation of ‘tough on crime,”
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a more liberal candidate may attempt to distinguish themselves by advertising that they are
‘tough but fair’ (Linde 1988). This can be done by focusing on certain traits and issues
when campaigning, receiving endorsements by partisan groups and individuals, or by
simply being known in the community as a Democrat or Republican. If a correlation
between partisanship and sentencing is found among nonpartisan judges, one may question
whether the lack of party label at the ballot box actually removes party from elections. I
examine this issue further in my discussion of operationalizing and measuring party
identification, and in my closing remarks.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

To empirically test the hypothesis that a judge’s partisan affiliation will affect their
sentencing behavior, I utilize felony sentencing data from Washington State. Washington
provides an ideal setting for my examination of the effects of partisan affiliation. Trial
judges in Washington are chosen in nonpartisan elections, and serve four year terms. Judges
who run in nonpartisan elections and serve long terms are considered to be more divorced
from the electoral connection than their partisan counterparts (Gordon and Huber 2004).
This electoral disconnect should allow Washington trial judges to give greater weight to
their own sentencing preferences as opposed to the preferences of their constituents.
Additionally, trial judges in Washington have been sentencing offenders under state
sentencing guidelines for over thirty years. The sentencing guideline regime is well
established in the state, and it provides judges with a large degree of personal discretion
when handing down a final sentence. Since its inception the Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission has collected a myriad of information on every felony sentence
handed down in the state. This has provided researchers with a unique opportunity to isolate
specific factors in sentencing while controlling for others. Lastly, the political landscape in
Washington has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. While all but two counties
voted Republican in the 1980 presidential election, the state has become largely split in the
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number of counties voting Republican and Democrat. This political transformation has
resulted in judges of both parties sitting in counties that have changed their partisan voting
preferences since the judge’s first election.
The dataset I use identifies all felony offenses for the years 2000 through 2006
within Washington State, as reported and collected by the Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission.1 The sentencing data includes a rich set of variables regarding
defendant characteristics, offense criteria, judge information, and applicable sentencing
guidelines for each offense. I augment this data by identifying the partisanship of the trial
judge using a proxy measure. The year 2000 provides a preferable starting point since it
marks the first year after Chelan and Douglas counties were split into separate judicial
districts.2 I limit my analysis to cases involving a visible violent offense, a set of cases in
which the judge is always able to exercise discretion in sentencing. The subset of cases
examined include those where the highest count was some form of aggravated assault,
robbery, or rape. This results in 10,231 observations for discretionary sentences handed
down by a total of 230 judges. Since the subset of cases being examined are more visible to
the public, there is greater potential for the judge’s sentence to be influenced by constituent
preferences and electoral considerations (Gordon and Huber 2004). This provides a more
conservative test of my hypothesis as it incorporates the electoral pressures that have been
found to influence sentencing decisions. More broadly speaking, this model recognizes

1

Data was obtained from Carlos Berdejo and Noam Yuchtman (2013). The authors modified the dataset by
including election data for each judge and then creating an electoral proximity variable based on this
information. This variable is discussed further in a later section.
2

Using data after this transformation occurred eliminates any potential influence that might be attributed to
the rearrangement of districts and change in constituencies.
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sentencing as a complex real-world process in which the trial judge must weigh a multitude
of often conflicting factors when handing down a criminal sentence.

Judicial Elections in Washington
Felony offenses in Washington are adjudicated in the Superior Courts, which are
currently organized into 32 judicial districts comprising 39 counties. These districts are
composed of either a single county or two or more adjacent counties. Superior Court judges
are elected and retained through nonpartisan elections and serve for a term of four years.
Their constituency is the entirety of their judicial district rather than just the county they
serve in. If more than one candidate files for election for the same seat, the candidates face
each other in what is considered a primary election, usually held in September of
presidential year elections. If one candidate in the primary obtains more than 50% of the
vote they are certified as the winner and do not appear on the ballot in the general election.
If no candidate receives more than 50% of the vote in the primary election, the top two vote
getters face each other in the general election. When a vacancy occurs on the court the
governor appoints a judge to fill the position and the appointee serves until the next general
election, at which point they must win election to serve the remainder of the term

Criminal Sentencing in Washington
Sentencing in Washington for felony offenses is governed by the Washington Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981 (WSRA).3 The WSRA establishes presumptive sentencing ranges

3

Revised Washington Code [RCW] 9.94A.310
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based on the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s prior criminal record.
Additionally, the guidelines for any given offense are affected by certain facts that warrant
an enhanced sentence, such as the presence of a firearm in the commission of a crime. For
any given case the trial judge’s discretion is largely – although not absolutely – constrained
by the applicable guideline ranges. For example, first degree assault4 is classified as a Class
A serious violent offense with a seriousness level of XII.5 To calculate the offender’s score
the judge or prosecutor assigns point values depending on the nature of the offender’s adult
and juvenile history. The seriousness level of the offense represents the row in the
sentencing matrix and the resulting offender score represents the column. An offender
convicted of first degree assault with an offender score of five (indicating the presence of a
prior record) would have a sentencing range of 138 to 184 months. If the offender is found
to have been in the possession of a firearm during the commission of the assault, 60 months
is added to the high end of the guideline range, creating a new range of 138 to 244 months.
The sentencing judge exercises full discretion in determining an appropriate length of
incarceration within this range.
Criminal sentencing at the state level was fundamentally altered following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely v. Washington (2004).6 Prior to the Blakely decision,
Washington judges had non-reviewable discretion to sentence an offender within the

4

RCW 9A.36.011

5

Offenses are divided in 16 seriousness levels determined by the legislature ranging from low (level I) to high
(level XVI).
6

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
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guideline range and could hand down sentences outside the standard range if they found
that “there were substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.”7
Exceptional sentences that were outside the standard range were subject to substantive
appellate review to determine if the sentence was reasonable. In Blakely the Supreme Court
held that any factual finding which authorized a judge to exceed the standard sentence
range must be found to exist by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, or agreed to by the
defendant when negotiating a plea agreement. The practical effect of the Court’s decision
was to limit the judge’s ability to impose a sentence above the standard range when the
defendant contests the facts that allow for the enhancement. Judges are still able to sentence
below the standard range in the presence of mitigating circumstances, and sentences below
and above the standard ranges are appealable by the state and defendant respectively.
A substantial number of criminal cases are adjudicated through plea agreements,
which are negotiated by attorneys in the shadow of the trial judge (Lacasse and Payne
1999). In other words, even in those cases settled through a plea agreement, the trial judge’s
sentencing preferences have an indirect effect on the prosecutor’s sentencing
recommendation (Bibas 2004). A judge is only expected to reject the terms of a plea
agreement if the punishment is inconsistent with the interests of justice and prosecuting
standards.8 Prosecutors exercise their own discretion in determining the specifics of each
charge that is filed, which results in different guidelines being applicable. Additionally,
judges are able to take into account certain mitigating factors that may justify a downward
7

RCW 9.94A.535.

8

RCW 9.94A.431.
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departure for a given case. All of these components, when combined, lead to variation in
sentencing outcomes in spite of the presence of a guideline structure.

Dependent Variable
The construction of the dependent variable for an analysis of criminal sentencing
has been handled differently by scholars in the field. In examining trial sentence outcomes
Berdejó and Yuchtman (2013) use the standard length of confinement in months as their
dependent variable. Other researchers examining sentencing outcomes in petty and
misdemeanor offenses, which often result in no confinement, have used a sentencing
severity scale as their dependent variable (Gibson 1980; Kuklinski and Stanga 1979; Nelson
2014).9 While using this severity scale has its advantages in its ability to account for
alternative punishments, the scale’s original construction has been repeatedly modified
overtime, and its applicability to felony sentences is less than ideal. Additionally, any
resulting coefficients are difficult to interpret in a substantive manner, since they do not
represent a length of time with regards to punishment. Since the cases I am examining are
serious felonies that are likely to result in a measurable length of incarceration, I utilize the
temporal length of the sentence in creating my dependent variable, with a maximum cap of
720 months. This cap recognizes a sentence of 60 years as being equivalent to a life
sentence (Gordon and Huber 2004; Johnson 2006).

9

Research on petty and misdemeanor offenses often requires examining sentences that are less than
incarceration, such a community service, probation, or fines. To account for this variation scholars have used
modified version of a sentencing severity scale that was originally printed in the 1968-70 edition of Federal
Offenders in U.S. District Courts.
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One problem that occurs when trying to model criminal sentencing data with the
original sentence length is that there is over-dispersion in the distribution of sentences, with
a large amount of cases falling on the lower end. Simply stated, the sentences are not
normally distributed, which undermines a basic assumption of regression analysis. To
correct for this issue, I transform the dependent variable by utilizing the natural logarithm
(+1) of length of incarceration (in months) handed down by the sentencing judge (Gordon
and Huber 2004, 2007). Adding the value of one is arbitrary, but it accords with previous
research as it prevents sentences of one month and less from being dropped (Johnson 2006;
Sullivan, McGloin, and Piquero 2008). Using the natural logarithm corrects the distribution
problem as it normalizes the data while also retaining the substantive effects of a sentence
increase. For example, a five month increase of a person’s sentence from five months to 10
is more serious than an equal increase from 50 to 55 months. The former increase doubles
the original sentence while the latter represents only a 10% increase. The natural log of the
sentence retains this assumption of proportional increase.
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Key Explanatory Variable
The key explanatory variable Party ID (PID) is used to represent the party
affiliation of the trial judge and is coded as either 0 or 1, where 0 equals affiliation with the
Democrat Party and 1 equals affiliation with the Republican Party. As discussed, judges in
Washington obtain their position either by election or appointment by the Governor. For
those judges that were appointed, I code their partisanship based on the partisan affiliation
of the appointing Governor. In states where governors have the power to appoint judges the
governor “tend[s] to appoint persons who have, through their past political, legal or social
actions reflected the values, policies, and preferences held by [the] Governor[]” (Sheldon
and Maule 1997, 106). In Washington the governor is able to appoint judges when a
vacancy occurs on a court or when a new seat is created by the legislature. As the
Washington governor has been a member of the Democratic Party since the beginning of
1985, the judges in the dataset were all Democratic appointees. There are a total of 57
judges who were appointed within the subset of observations, representing a total of 2,838
discretionary sentences.
Since judges in Washington are chosen through nonpartisan elections, identifying
which of the two major parties the judge identifies with presents an initial obstacle. As
previously discussed, one of my assumptions is that judges running for office will seek to
signal to voters their partisan identification through local campaigning and endorsements. If
candidates for the bench are sending these partisan signals, the voters most likely to pick-up
on them would be those most interested and active in politics. Prior research has generally
shown that those voters who are politically active and more ideologically extreme are most
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likely to participate in a state’s primary election (Brady, Han, and Pope 2007; Norrander
1989). Because judicial elections are low-salience affairs for the general public, they
become more salient for elite activists who work to mobilize primary voters (Key 1956;
Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). In short, “nonpartisan elections … attract the more
attentive voter” Baum (1994, 167). An underlying assumption in my partisan proxy
measure is that voters who participate in Washington’s primary elections will be
knowledgeable enough to differentiate competing judicial candidates.
Given this assumption I use the voting results from Washington’s primary elections
to measure a judge’s partisanship. I measure the partisanship of the trial judge by looking at
the primary election results from when the judge was first elected to the bench, as long as
that election is contested.10 Focusing on the judge’s first election, and only those elections
that are challenged, I ensure that primary voters had a choice between at least two
candidates. To determine the partisanship of the judicial candidate who wins the primary
election, I use the results from the U.S. House of Representatives primary for the same
county. For example, if the voters in a given county cast more total votes in the
congressional race for the Democratic Party primary candidates than for the Republican
Party primary candidates, I code the judge who wins their contested primary election as a
Democrat. In those judicial races where the judge is elected by voters of multiple counties I
add the votes for the U.S. House race for each county to ensure that all votes are accounted
for. Again, the assumption is that primary voters casting a Republican ballot will vote for a

10

Election results were obtained from the Washington State Secretary of State website
(www.sos.wa.gov/elections/press.apx) and through the county auditor websites of the various Washington
counties.
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Republican U.S. House candidate and the judicial candidate that most closely aligns with
the Republican Party. An added benefit of this measure is that it captures the partisanship of
the judge at the time of election and holds that partisanship constant even though
constituency ideology may change over time. In other words, this measure of judicial
partisanship should be exogenous to constituent ideology over time. As this is a unique
method by which to measure judicial partisanship the reader may question its validity. I
discuss this aspect in greater detail in my concluding remarks on further research.
To help in explaining this measurement I provide an example by means of Judge
William Acey, who was first elected in September 2000 to the Superior Court of Asotin,
Columbia, and Garfield counties. Judge Acey ran against Scott Boyles for an open seat on
the court in the September primary. Judge Acey received 79% of the vote in Asotin, 75% of
the vote in Columbia, and 84% of the vote in Garfield. Voters participating in the
September primary were also able to cast a ballot for a U.S. House candidate. Asotin,
Columbia, and Garfield County all wholly reside in the state’s Fifth Congressional District,
in which two Democratic candidates, two Republican candidates, and an Independent were
running to appear in the General Election. In Asotin County the Republican primary
candidates received a combined 69% of the two party vote share; in Columbia County they
received 79%, and in Garfield County they received 81%.11 Judge Acey won all three
counties by a significant majority, and the Republican Party’s House candidates won each
county by an almost similar margin. In total, Judge Acey won 79% of the vote share in his

Total ballots cast for each county were: Asotin – 4,926 judicial ballots; 4,616 House ballots. Columbia –
1,370 judicial ballots; 1,416 House ballots. Garfield – 977 judicial ballots; 973 House ballots.
11
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election, and the Republican Party won 73% of the two party vote share among the same
pool of voters. Judge Acey is therefore coded as Republican under the assumption that the
primary voters who participated in the election possessed information regarding Judge
Acey’s party preference.
Using the previously discussed method, I am able to determine the partisanship of
70 judges, representing 3,432 discretionary sentences. These 70 judges obtained their seat
through a competitive primary election in a county or counties that also had a competitive
U.S. House primary. Judges whose partisanship was not able to be determined either first
obtained their seat in an uncontested election, or obtained their seat in a county or counties
that did not have a competitive two-party House primary. Additionally, several of
Washington’s larger counties, which hold a disproportionate share of judicial seats, do not
require that an uncontested judge appear on the ballot.12 The total number of judges, both
elected and appointed, whose party affiliation was able to be determined is 127, accounting
for 6,270 discretionary sentences. Forty-four percent of judges were identified by using the
party of the appointed governor, and 56% were identified through the electoral proxy
measure. Of those judges whose affiliation was identified, 71% were coded as Democrat
and 29% were coded as Republican. Democratic judges clearly outnumber their Republican
counterparts in my analysis. This is not surprising given the fact that Washington is, and
has been, largely Democratic, and that slightly less than half of the judges included were
measured using the appointing governor’s party.
12

Counties with a population of more than 100,000 residents automatically issue a certificate of election to a
candidate running for election to the bench if no other candidate has filed for the position by the end of the
withdrawal period. For the years examined this included Benton, Clark, King, Kitsap, Pierce, Skagit,
Snohomish, Spokane, Thurston, Whatcom, and Yakima county.
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Control Variables
County Ideology: One factor that can influence sentencing behavior of trial judges is
the overall ideology of the county they preside in. Elected trial judges may feel constrained
to issue sentences that will be agreeable with their constituency, meaning Democratic
leaning judges in Republican counties may feel pressured to hand down more punitive
sentences, even though they would prefer a less severe sentence. To control for county
ideology, I include the variable County ID (CID) which is measured as the percentage of
the county casting a vote in the closest presidential election for the Democratic Party
candidate. The value used for each observation is the county election result from the
presidential election that occurred closest to the sentence date. As an example, for a
sentence handed down in November of 2005 the results used would be from the 2004
election, as that represents the closest presidential contest. Presidential vote share at the
county or district level is a commonly employed proxy measure for estimating the ideology
of the county (Carson et al. 2010; Jacobson 2009; Minozzi and Volden 2013).
A potential concern is that the County ID variable will be highly correlated with the
measurement of a judge’s partisanship as both use county election results. Statistical
analysis shows that the correlation between these two variables is -0.29, a mild correlation
in the expected direction. This partly results from the spread of appointed judges, who are
all coded as Democrat but were appointed in both Republican and Democrat dominated
counties. Of the cases examined by appointed Democrat judges, 31% occurred in a county
that leaned Republican. An additional reason for this low correlation is the shift in
partisanship at the county level that has occurred in Washington over the course of the
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1980s and 1990s. Western Washington has gone from being almost solidly Republican in
the 1980s to majority Democratic beginning in the 1990s. Alternatively, eastern
Washington has gone from being a mix of Republican and Democratic counties in the
1990s, to being solidly Republican since 2000. The fact that counties in Washington have
changed over time is significant since an elected judge is only coded at the time he is first
elected to the bench, and his partisanship remains constant thereafter. A judge elected in
Democratic controlled Spokane County in 1996 would be representing a county that voted
for a Republican candidate in the presidential elections that pertain to the data being
examined. In other words, Washington’s intra-partisan shifts over the past several decades
has resulted in longer tenured judges often presiding in counties that have swung towards
the opposite party since they were elected. These partisan swings allow a unique
opportunity for examining whether changing constituents influence a judge’s presumed
sentencing preferences.
Electoral Proximity: The proximity of the upcoming election can lead to judges of
both parties handing down increasingly more severe sentences as their election approaches
in an attempt to maintain a tough on crime image (Gordon and Huber 2004, 2007; Berdejo
and Yuchtman 2013). To control for electoral cycle, I use Berdejo and Yuchtman’s coding,
which represents the linear distance between a judge’s first day in office and the day of
election. This distance is measured on a continuous scale of 0 to 1, where 0 represents
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maximum electoral pressure and 1 represents a judge’s first day following an election.13
This variable was constructed by Berdejo and Yuchtman using county level election data
from the Washington State Secretary of State’s office.
Adjudication Type: Another factor that is likely to influence sentencing decisions is
whether the case is adjudicated via a plea agreement as opposed to going to trial. Prior
literature demonstrates that defendants who agree to plead guilty and thus save the state the
cost of going to trial are more likely to receive a sentence less severe than they would have
had they lost at trial (Adelstein 1978; Alboneti 1997; Taha 2001). This, however, is not a
guarantee; rather pleading guilty is a calculated decision on the part of the defendant based
on an assessment of a variety of factors, including the odds of success at trial, the potential
sentence if found guilty, and the current sentence being offered by the state. Additionally,
while the prosecutor may enter into an agreement on the charges, he can only recommend a
sentence based on the guidelines. The judge still retains the authority to use his/her
discretion when handing down the final sentence. To control for this influential factor, I
include the dummy variable plea, with 0 indicating adjudication by trial and 1 representing
a guilty plea. I predict that defendants who plead guilty to the charged offense will receive a
less severe sentence than those who are found guilty at trial.
Defendant Characteristics: As previously mentioned and in accordance with the
literature in the criminology field, defendant characteristics play a significant role in
sentencing (Bushway and Piehl 2001; Curan 1983; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer
13

The authors construct their electoral proximity measure by taking the number of days between the date of
sentence and the judge’s next election. This number is then divided by 1,461, which is the number of days in
four years, a full election cycle for trial judges. A sentence handed down on the judge’s first day on the bench
would be equal to 1 and a sentence handed down on the day of election would be equal to 0. Gordon and
Huber (2004) operationalize electoral proximity in the same manner.
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1998). My model includes the defendant’s age, gender, minority status, and prior criminal
history to control for these factors. Age is calculated using the defendant’s date of birth and
date of sentencing, thus indicating the age of the defendant on the date he was sentenced as
opposed to the date of the offense. Minority status is captured through a dichotomous
variable measuring whether the defendant is a non-Hispanic Caucasian (coded as 1) or any
other racial group (coded as 0). This information is provided for each case by the WSSGC
in their reporting. Prior criminal history is also coded as a dichotomous variable indicating
whether the defendant either has or does not have a prior criminal history. In accordance
with previous findings, I predict that females will receive less severe sentences than their
male counterparts, minority defendants will receive more severe sentences than Caucasians,
and those with a prior history will receive more severe sentences than those without
(Albonetti 1991, 1997; Dixon 1995; Spohn and Holleran 2000; Zatz 2000)
Sentencing Controls: Each defendant’s sentence range is calculated by the trial
judge who completes a sentencing worksheet created by the WSSGC. The outcome is a
sentencing range that is capped at both the low and high end. The recommended minimum
and maximum sentence provided by the WSSGC worksheet provides an ideal measure to
control for the severity of the offense committed as it takes into account the nature of the
offense, the level of violence, and the defendant’s prior history. The guideline ranges reflect
a consensus within the state on the appropriate length of incarceration given the unique
nature of each case and defendant. The variables low range and high range are included to
reflect the guideline range that is applicable for each case.
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To control for the effects of the Supreme Court’s Blakely decision I include a
dummy variable indicating whether the sentence was handed down prior to or after the
decision was handed down. Since Blakely had the effect of diminishing the trial judge’s
discretion to hand down more severe sentences, I predict that there will be fewer sentences
exceeding the standard range after the Blakely decision.
Table 1 provides case-level summary statistics for the dependent variable, key
explanatory variable, and control variables.

Table 1
Summary Statistics for Model Variables
Variable
Assigned Sentence (months)
Assigned Sentence (natural log +1)
Judge Party Identification (1=Republican)
County Democratic Vote Share
Defendant Male (1=yes)
Defendant White (1=yes)
Age of Defendant (years)
Any Prior Convictions (1=yes)
Adjudicated via Plea (1=yes)
Electoral Proximity
Assault (1=yes) [reference]
Rape (1=yes)
Robbery (1=yes)
Post Blakely (1=yes)
Low end of Guideline Range
High end of Guideline Range

Mean
46.66
3.03
0.29
0.514
0.92
0.61
29.8
0.52
0.93
0.54
0.59
0.03
0.38
0.41
35.79
47.13

SD
90.67
1.22
0.45
0.09
0.27
0.49
10.3
0.50
0.26
0.29
0.49
0.17
0.49
0.49
54.95
67.04

Min
0
0
0
0.226
0
0
15.84
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2.25
6.75

Max
720
6.58
1
0.7
1
1
84.72
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
703.5
720

N = 6,270

The summary statistics indicate that the average defendants in the cases examined
are white males approximately thirty years of age who have at least one prior conviction.
Furthermore, a substantial majority of cases, 93%, are adjudicated by means of a plea
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bargain with the prosecutor. While a prosecutor’s recommendation of a negotiated sentence
is taken into consideration by the trial judge, the judge is not bound by this recommendation
and is free to hand down a sentence anywhere within the guideline ranges.
Since only 29% of cases are heard by Republican judges, it is important to
determine whether judges of both parties have handled similar cases within this sample. If
Democratic judges overwhelmingly handle more serious offenses, or offenders with prior
convictions, then the assumption of random assignment might be brought into question. The
first three columns of Table 2 compare case characteristics of both sets of judges with pvalue tests for equality of means reported in column three.
Women make-up about 9% of the sample in both groups and minority defendants in
both groups make up about 40%. About 52% have at least one prior conviction and both
groups heard a similar mixture of assault, robbery, and rape cases. Some of the case
characteristics do differ across the two groups. One area of cases that in which the
difference between groups achieves statistical significance is the percentage of cases
adjudicated by plea agreement; 93% for Democrats and 91% for Republicans. Although
this difference is substantively small, it raises an initial concern that attorney negotiations
may be systematically different depending on the party affiliation of the judge. That the low
and high end of the guideline ranges are the same for both groups does appear to
demonstrate that judges of both parties were working within similar guidelines when
sentencing.

Table 2
Case Characteristics for Republican and Democrat Judges
All Violent offenses

Pleas Only

Trials Only

(1)
Democrat
Judges

(2)
Republican
Judges

(3)
Dem =
Rep

(1)
Democrat
Judges

(2)
Republican
Judges

(3)
Dem =
Rep

(1)
Democrat
Judges

(2)
Republican
Judges

(3)
Dem =
Rep

Variable

Mean

Mean

p-value

Mean

Mean

p-value

Mean

Mean

p-value

County Democratic Vote Share

0.532

0.471

0.000

0.531

0.471

0.000

0.545

0.473

0.000

Defendant Male (1=yes)

0.919

0.915

0.571

0.916

0.912

0.583

0.961

0.949

0.543

Defendant White (1=yes)

0.600

0.619

0.176

0.607

0.627

0.146

0.515

0.529

0.774

Age of Defendant (years)

29.98

29.36

0.032

29.74

29.03

0.016

33.10

32.85

0.804

Any Prior Convictions (1=yes)

0.522

0.531

0.535

0.510

0.522

0.388

0.687

0.618

0.141

Adjudicated via Plea (1=yes)

0.931

0.913

0.016

1.000

1.000

0.000

0.000

Assault

0.581

0.598

0.225

0.588

0.598

0.519

0.482

0.599

0.017

Rape

0.030

0.031

0.914

0.021

0.024

0.439

0.159

0.102

0.096

Robbery

0.389

0.371

0.205

0.391

0.378

0.377

0.36

0.299

0.198

Electoral Proximity

0.551

0.527

0.003

0.553

0.528

0.003

0.524

0.521

0.920

Post Blakely (1=yes)

0.451

0.291

0.000

0.469

0.305

0.000

0.21

0.134

0.044

Low End of Guidelines Range

35.53

36.43

0.555

31.14

31.98

0.537

94.52

83.19

0.243

High End of Guidelines Range

46.79

47.96

0.530

41.45

42.54

0.516

118.63

104.97

0.240

Observations

4,463

1,807

4,154

1,650

309

157

P-values come from a two-tailed test that the mean of Democrat judges equals the mean of Republican judges.

34

35
To further examine the issue of attorney negotiations Table 2, columns four to nine
look at the case characteristics for both groups of judges for only cases where a plea
agreement was reached (columns four to six) and where the defendant went to trial
(columns seven to nine). The two characteristics that deserve mentioning are the difference
in means of assault and rape cases that were decided by trial. The difference in these cases
being decided by trial rather than plea agreement may reflect the decision-making of the
attorneys handling the cases. It is possible that defense attorneys and prosecutors
strategically determine whether to negotiate a plea agreement in light of the presiding judge
who is that is assigned to the case. This does not fully explain why Republican judges
preside over more assault trials and fewer rape trials than Democratic judges. For now, I
believe the lack of significance in the means of the guideline ranges demonstrates that
judges from both parties handed down sentences in which they were constrained by similar
sentencing grids.

Empirical Model
The unit of observation in my data set is the case i, heard by judge j, within county
k. Each case represents a specific defendant, offense, sentence date, and sentence. My
empirical model is as follows:
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝐹(𝑡) + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑘 + 𝑍𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘
(1)
where sentenceijk is the sentence outcome associated with case i (natural logarithm); F(t) is
a set of year fixed effects, including a dummy variable indicating whether the case was
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decided before or after Blakely; PIDik,, my explanatory variable of interest, is the party
identification of the sentencing judge, Zijk contains a set of defendant, offense, county, and
sentencing guideline controls; and εijk is a mean-zero stochastic error term.
Because some aspects of observations, such as the offense, defendant
characteristics, and sentencing guidelines are specific only to the case while other aspects
such as judge party affiliation and constituent ideology are characteristics of the judge and
county, the data exists at multiple levels of analysis. To accurately model effects that occur
at different levels of analysis while correctly apportioning the variance explained at each
level, I utilize a multilevel model that contains fixed effects for both the judge who issued
the sentence and the county in which the judge is employed (Gelman 2006; Nelson 2014;
Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In this model individual cases are nested within judges, and
those judges are nested within counties. Since each judge is expected to sentence differently
based on their personal sentencing philosophy, nesting the cases at this level allows me to
control for the variance in judge’s sentencing not accounted for in my model. Additionally,
judges are nested within one of the counties that makeup Washington State, and differences
in sentencing may exist both within these counties and across counties.
In using a hierarchical linear model (HLM), equation (1) can be more accurately
articulated as:1
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾000 + 𝜈00𝑘 + 𝛿0𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘
(2)

Foundation and interpretation for this model is based off Steenbergen and Jones’ (2002) European Union
study (227-234).
1
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In this revised model, γ000 represents the grand mean of sentencing across cases, judges,
and counties. ν00k represents the sources of cross-county variation which would cause
specific counties to deviate from the grand mean. Similarly, δ0jk contains sources of crossjudge variation that would cause deviation from the grand mean. Lastly, εijk represents
variation across individual cases that cause deviation from the grand mean. Having
specified the relevant factors that are likely to influence the sentence outcome, the
individual-level of my model is expressed as:
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼0𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑘 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼2𝑗𝑘 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼3𝑗𝑘 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘
+ 𝛼4𝑗𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼5𝑗𝑘 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼6𝑗𝑘 𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘
(3)
Where Genderjk is a dichotomous variable representing the defendant’s sex, Raceijk contains
a dummy variable indicating racial minority status, Ageijk is a continuous variable of
defendant’s age at sentence, Priorsijk is a dummy variable representing the existence of a
prior record, Pleaijk is a dummy variable controlling for whether the offender entered into a
plea agreement with the state or received a trial, and GLijk contains variables controlling for
the applicable sentencing guideline ranges
Judge party affiliation (PID), the independent variable of interest, is nested at the
judge level, along with electoral proximity (lindist). The formal expression of the model at
the judge level would be introduced into the model via the case-level constant α0jk, where:
𝛼0𝑗𝑘 = 𝛽00𝑘 + 𝛽01𝑘 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽02𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑘 + 𝛿0𝑗𝑘
(4)
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Modeling the judge-level constant β00k, I can introduce the county-level variable of
constituent ideology (CID) as follows:
𝛽00𝑘 = 𝛾000 + 𝛾001 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑘 + 𝜈00𝑘
(5)
The variable CIDk is the proxy measure for county ideology, calculated as the percentage of
the county that supported the Democratic presidential nominee. Assuming that the effect of
judge level characteristics is fixed and the effect of case-level predictors are also fixed
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 229), the complete multilevel model is expressed as:
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛾000 + 𝛾001 𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑘 + 𝛾010 𝑃𝐼𝐷𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾020 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾100 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑘
+ 𝛾200 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾300 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾400 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛾500 𝑃𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑘
+ 𝛾600 𝐺𝐿𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜈00𝑘 + 𝛿0𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘
(6)
By specifying the model at different levels of analysis and acknowledging that the variables
I have included do not fully account for all variation in sentencing, the variance
components for εijk, δ0jk, and ν00k, can capture the unexplained variance in sentencing at
different levels of analysis.

Results and Discussion
Table 3 includes the results from two separate analyses. Model 1 provides an initial
test of the partisan influence hypothesis by using the previously discussed dichotomous
measure of party affiliation. Since the dependent variable has been transformed using the
natural logarithm of the sentence, the coefficients are best interpreted as a percentage
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Table 3
Hierarchical Linear Model
(1)
Baseline
Model
County level:
County Ideology
Judge level:
Electoral Proximity
Republican Judge

Percent
Change

0.347
(.213)

0.333
(.215)

-0.084
(.061)
0.043*
(.020)

-0.084
(.063)
0.023
(.023)
0.028
(.044)
0.298**
(.112)

+ 4.4

Republican Judge * Robbery
Republican Judge * Rape
Case level:
Defendant Male
Defendant White
Defendant Age
Prior Convictions
Adjudicated via Guilty Plea
Robbery
Rape
Post Blakely
Guideline Minimum
Guideline Maximum
Constant
Log likelihood

(2)
Interaction
Model

0.250***
(.026)
-0.031**
(.011)
0.001
(.001)
0.498***
(.020)
-0.223***
(.044)
0.306***
(.022)
0.612***
(.107)
.079†
(.047)
0.027***
(.005)
-0.010**
(.004)
1.979
-6654.86

+ 28.4
- 3.1

+ 64.5
- 25
+ 35.8
+ 84.4

+ 2.7
- 1.0

Percent
Change

+ 34.7

0.248***
(.026)
-0.031**
(.011)
0.001
(.001)
0.497***
(.020)
-0.225***
(.046)
0.298***
(.022)
0.523***
(.110)
0.080†
(.047)
0.027***
(.005)
-0.010**
(.004)
1.994
-6651.41

Notes: Dependent variable is the natural log of the sentence (in months) assigned by the judge. Robust
standard errors are included in parentheses. N = 6,270 for both models. Year effects are excluded from results.
Both models are significant at the .001 level or better based on Wald χ2 test. Standard errors are clustered
around counties. ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 †P < 0.10
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change on the sentence handed down given a unit change in the independent variable. This
change is provided in the model in the second column for all variables that achieve
statistical significance at the .10 level or better. Model 2 provides a more conservative test
of the partisan hypothesis by interacting partisanship with each specific offense. This
interaction examines whether one category of offenses is more likely to be influenced by
the partisanship of the sentencing judge. Since R-squared values are an inappropriate
measure of model fit when using HLM (Kreft and De Leeuw 1998), the log likelihood
values are used to compare the two models. When comparing the log likelihood values
between two models measuring the same dependent variable, the model with the lower log
likelihood is considered to be a better predictor. While the change in the log likelihood
values between the two models is substantively small, the smaller value in Model 2
indicates that it may provide a slightly better fit than Model 1.
The results from Model 1 indicate that a Republican judge will hand down a
sentence that is approximately 3.6% longer than a Democratic judge, ceteris paribus. The
result is statistically significant at the .10 level. Rather surprisingly, the coefficient for the
county ideology measure is in the opposite direction as hypothesized, although this finding
fails to achieve significance. Judges from the examined set of cases do not appear to be
influenced by the changing partisanship of their constituency, at least with regards to
sentencing decisions. Additionally, the electoral proximity variable, while in the expected
direction, also fails to achieve a level of significance. The cases examined in this study and
the addition of the partisanship measure casts some initial doubt on the literature claiming
judges sentence more severely as they approach election. As expected, several of the case
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characteristic variables that have been shown to have an effect on sentencing achieve high
levels of significance. Males are likely to receive a sentence that is almost 30% longer than
females. White offenders can expect a sentence that is about 3% lower than non-whites.
The presence of at least one prior conviction can have the effect of increasing sentence
length approximately 65%, and an offender who forgoes a trial in favor of a guilty plea can
expect a 25% decrease in their sentence.
Model 2 casts a somewhat different light on the partisan hypothesis, and the results
appear to show that rape offenses are the cases where the judges’ partisanship have the
largest effect. The coefficient for the party ID and rape interaction is substantively large and
achieves greater statistical significance than the party ID coefficient by itself in Model 1.
Additionally, all of the control variables maintain their effects in both models. Of the three
categories of crimes included, rape is generally the most heinous and the sentences handed
down are much larger than for assault and robbery. This hold true for Democratic and
Republican judges, both of whom hand down more severe sentences for rape offenses than
for assault and robbery offenses. This violent crime may represent the very type of criminal
conduct that a Republican judge believes deserves a “tough on crime” approach. Based on
these findings, a person convicted of rape can expect a sentence increase of 34% attributed
solely to the partisanship of the sentencing judge. Based on these findings, an offender
sentenced to ten years in prison by a Democratic judge for the crime of rape would receive
an additional three years by a Republican judge.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the marginal effects of party
identification on sentencing behavior for each of the three categories of offenses, holding
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all other variables at their mean. The effects shown in Figure 1 are derived from the
interaction effects captured in Model 2. The purpose of Figure 1 is to show the party ID
variable in relation to its 95% confidence band. For the assault and robbery offenses, the
bands for both groups of judges are small and largely indistinguishable from each other. For
the rape offense the bands become larger but only slightly overlap. While partisanship does
not appear to play a significant role in sentencing of assault and robbery offenders, it does
factor in when sentencing offenders guilty of the more emotionally charged crime of rape.

Figure 1: Effects of party identification.
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One explanation for the large effects of partisanship on rape sentences may be the
highly visible and graphic nature of this crime. Given the theory that Republican judges
will seek to hold individuals personally accountable for their actions and will value
punishment and retribution over rehabilitation, the emotional and graphic facts of a rape
crime may have a greater psychological effect on the judge than the fact patterns of assault
and robbery cases. An offender convicted of rape may, as a result of his heinous conduct,
trigger a Republican judge’s underlying belief that punishment should be most severe when
the offense is as egregious as sexually assaulting another person. Democratic judges,
employing a more liberal and contextual approach to sentencing, are therefore expected to
hand down a sentence within the applicable guidelines, but with a focus on rehabilitation
and deterrence. A Democratic judge may also give more weight to the external
circumstances of the offender’s situation, such as his familial history, educational
background, and socioeconomic status. That is not to imply that these are excuses used to
justify the behavior, but rather to show ideology results in judges giving different weights
to different factors when they hand down sentences.
In addition to the judge’s personal sentencing philosophy, rape offenses and
subsequent sentencing decisions are likely to be monitored more closely by media outlets
and potential political opponents. Simply stated, a rape story can be easily sensationalized
by local media, who will then follow the case and report on its progress. Montana trial court
judge G. Todd Baugh received national media attention and public backlash when he
sentenced a convicted rapist to 30 days in jail, suspending the remainder of the 15-year
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prison term.2 Rather than run for reelection the judge chose to step down when his term
expired. More recently, a California trial judge was thrust into the headlines when he
sentenced an offender convicted of rape to a 10-year prison term, ruling that the mandatory
minimum sentence of 25-years to life would amount to cruel and unusual punishment.3
Three county supervisors called for the judge to resign and pledged to support a petition
drive to obtain the required amount of signatures to have the judge recalled. The visibility
of rape offenses, as portrayed through these examples, may provide an opportunity for
Republican judges to demonstrate their “tough on crime” approaches to sentencing, a
campaign slogan often used by conservative judges (Linde 1988). In other words, the
Republican judge is leveraging the high visibility of rape cases to demonstrate to voters that
he is making good on his campaign promise. Unlike the more lenient sentences in the
examples, these harsher sentences would appease local constituents and fail to rise to the
level of national media focus.

Preston, Jennifer. 2013. “Protesters Demand Montana Judge Resign Over Rape Sentencing.” New York
Times, August 29, 2013.
2

Associated Press. 2015. “County Leaders Call for Judge to Quit Over Sodomy Sentence.” New York Times,
April 9, 2015.
3

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Trial judges in the United States are the only persons authorized to incarcerate
individual citizens. While their decisions are often constrained by sentencing guidelines and
other institutional factors, there exists a broad area in which they are able to exercise
individual discretion. To better understand how a given judge will determine a final
sentence in a case, I have put forward a theoretical argument that places the decisionmaking process within the judge’s personal views on the root causes of crime and the
purposes of punishment.
If a judge’s individual ideology is a factor that affects their sentencing behavior,
then it should be considered in discussions on the merits of judicial selection methods. In
Washington State, trial judges are chosen through nonpartisan elections. If one purpose of
judicial elections is to allow the electorate to decide what qualities are preferred in a judge,
then allowing the candidates to openly affiliate with a political party may better inform
citizens on how they will handle sentencing decisions. As long as sentencing is determined
by individual human beings, and these individuals are allowed some degree of discretion in
their decision-making, there is likely to exist discrepancy in the outcome. An additional
question then is whether the general public, possessing a desire for more severe punishment
of criminals, should in fact be responsible for the selection of trial judges. While reasonable
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people may disagree on these normative questions, political scientists can assist in the
discussion by providing empirical evidence that leads to more informed policy debates.
This research has primarily focused on only one factor that influences decisionmaking by trial judges, the judge’s own ideology. A comprehensive study of decisionmaking by these political actors would entail an integrated model that examines the
additional factors that affect decision-making and how these factors are connected. Such an
integrated model would include the influence that sensationalized media stories of criminal
cases have on the public’s opinion on sentencing. This information would then be
integrated with the method of judicial selection used by the state. States where trial judges
are elected could be looked at against states where they are appointed to see whether public
opinion and electoral concerns are influencing sentencing decisions. Furthermore, the
electoral proximity hypothesis deserves further investigation to better understand the effect
that elections have on decision-making, especially when the election is imminent. While I
have attempted to control for prosecutorial discretion by accounting for plea agreements
and trials, prosecutors deserve a much more extensive focus as unique political actors in the
sentencing process. In Washington State each county elects a district attorney in partisan
elections. These actors may have their own political agendas and electoral constraints, and
they often dictate to prosecutors what charges to file in a case. Lastly, as I have attempted
to show in this research, the ideology of the judge must be accounted for to gain an
understanding of what his views are on the root causes of crime and the purpose of
sentencing.
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In further research I hope to begin to connect the various theories that have
developed in the literature to create an integrated model of decision-making that can be
applied to state trial judges and their behavior in criminal sentencing. One component of
this model requires knowing the partisanship of the trial judge, which can be difficult to
obtain given the prominence of nonpartisan elections. I believe the measure that I have used
in this research can be tested by leveraging the election systems used in many of the states.
Approximately 20 states employ closed primaries, in which each voter is only permitted to
vote in his or her party’s primary. Publically available voter rolls from these states
generally include biographical information on each voter and which party’s primary
election they voted in for each election year. If current and past trial judges in the state are
active participants in elections, then their party affiliation should be clear from the primary
election in which they choose to vote. Once this data is collected, additional factors can be
added in to see what measures correlate with the judge’s partisanship. My use of primary
election results from contested elections could then be measured against the actual
partisanship of the judge – as indicated by their voting history – to test the validity of the
measure. To my knowledge, no scholarship has attempted to leverage public voter rolls in
states with primary elections to examine the partisanship of political actors selected through
nonpartisan elections. To be sure, such a collection and cross referencing of data would
require substantial time and resources. The collection of this data could have profound
effects on judicial elections scholarship and on nonpartisan elections research in general. If
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a candidate is running for office in a nonpartisan election but has voted in the Republican
primary for the past 10 years, then is the election nonpartisan in name only? I hope to
answer this question more fully in future work.
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